

QUANTUM CIRCUIS and SIMPLE QUANTUM ALGORITHMS

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Part I

Seminal quantum algorithms

SEMINAL QUANTUM ALGORITHMS

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- The fastest classical algorithm to factor an m -bit integer that is product of two primes has exponential complexity $\mathcal{O}(e^{cm^{1/3}(\lg m)^{2/3}})$, where e is the basis of natural logarithms.
- The fact that there is not known classical algorithm to factor integers is playing very important role in cryptography - for making secure encryptions and secure digital signatures.

LARGEST PRIME

On February 3, 2016 C. Cooper from university Missouri announced a new (Mersene) prime

$$2^{74207181}$$

that has 5 millions more digits as previously known largest prime.

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Trapdoor information: p, q, d (decryption exponent)

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Plaintext w

Encryption: cryptotext $c = w^e \text{ mod } n$

Decryption: plaintext $w = c^d \text{ mod } n$

RSA CHALLENGE

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Decrypt the cryptotext:

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**encrypted using the RSA cryptosystem with 129 digit number, called also
RSA129**

n : 114 381 625 757 888 867 669 235 779 976 146 612 010 218 296 721 242 362
562 561 842 935 706 935 245 733 897 830 597 123 513 958 705 058 989 075 147
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and with $e = 9007$.

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The problem was solved in 1994 by first factorizing n into one 64-bit prime and one 65-bit prime, and then computing the **plaintext**

THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEMISH OSSIFRAGE

FROM RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM to RSA SIGNATURES

The idea of RSA cryptosystem is simple.

Public key: modulus $n = pq$ and encryption exponent e .

Secret key: decryption exponent d and primes p, q

Encryption of a message w : $c = w^e$

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and $w = s^e$ can then be verification of such a signature.

WHY ARE RSA ENCRYPTIONS and SIGNATURES SECURE?

RSA encryptions and signatures are considered as secure because there is not known a methods that could be able factorize in RSA used moduly on current and in near future forseearable classical supercomputers.

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By using Euclid's algorithm to compute

$$\gcd(a + 1, n) \quad \text{and} \quad \gcd(a - 1, n)$$

we can find, in $O(\lg n)$ steps, a prime factor of n .

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
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- 3 Find period r of function $a^k \bmod n$.
- 4 If r is odd or $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then go to step 1; otherwise stop.

If this algorithm stops, then $a^{r/2}$ is a non-trivial solution of the equation

$$x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$$

A GENERAL SCHEME for Shor's ALGORITHM

The following flow diagram shows the general scheme of Shor's quantum factorization algorithm



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- 2 By measuring the last register the state collapses into the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}} \sum_{j=0}^A |n, a, q, jr + l, y\rangle \text{ or, shortly } \frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}} \sum_{j=0}^A |jr + l\rangle,$$

where A is the largest integer such that $l + Ar \leq q$, r is the period of $a^x \bmod n$ and l is the offset.

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- 5 By measuring the resulting state we get $c = \frac{jq}{r}$ and if $\gcd(j, r) = 1$, what is very likely, then from c and q we can determine the period r .

DISCRETE FOURIER TRANSFORM

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Discrete Fourier Transform maps a vector $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1})^T$ into the vector $DFT(\mathbf{a}) = A_n \mathbf{a}$, where A_n is an $n \times n$ matrix such that $A_n[i, j] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \omega^{ij}$ for $0 \leq i, j < n$ and $\omega = e^{2\pi i/n}$ is the n th root of unity.

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The matrix A_n has therefore the form

$$A_n = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & \omega & \omega^2 & \dots & \omega^{(n-1)} \\ 1 & \omega^2 & \omega^4 & \dots & \omega^{2(n-1)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{(n-1)} & \omega^{2(n-1)} & \dots & \omega^{(n-1)^2} \end{pmatrix}.$$

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The Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform is the mapping

$$DFT^{-1}(\mathbf{a}) = A_n^{-1} \mathbf{a},$$

where

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where for any $c \in \{0, \dots, q-1\}$

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defined for $0 \leq a < q$, by the unitary matrix

$$F_q = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & \omega & \omega^2 & \dots & \omega^{(q-1)} \\ 1 & \omega^2 & \omega^4 & \dots & \omega^{2(q-1)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{(q-1)} & \omega^{2(q-1)} & \dots & \omega^{(q-1)^2} \end{pmatrix},$$

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Observe that

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$$\alpha_c = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\sqrt{r}} e^{2\pi il_y c/q}, & \text{if } c \text{ is a multiple of } \frac{q}{r}; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

Therefore

$$|\phi_{out}\rangle = \text{QFT}_q |\phi_l\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{r}} \sum_{j=0}^{r-1} e^{2\pi i l y j / r} |j \frac{q}{r}\rangle.$$

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The key point now is that the trouble-making offset l_y appears now in the phase factor $e^{2\pi i l_y j / r}$ and has influence neither on the probabilities nor on values obtained by the measurement.

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Period extraction

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Each measurement of the state $|\phi_{out}\rangle$ therefore yields one of the values $c = \lambda \frac{q}{r}$, $\lambda \in \{0, 1, \dots, r-1\}$, where each λ is chosen with the same probability $\frac{1}{r}$.

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In the general case, i.e., if

$$A \neq \frac{q}{r} - 1,$$

there is only a more sophisticated computation of the resulting probabilities and a more sophisticated way to determine r (using a **continuous fraction method** to extract the period from its approximation).

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- An analysis of Shor's algorithm therefore shows that by running the algorithm $\mathcal{O}(\lg \lg n)$ times, therefore in total in $\mathcal{O}(\lg^3 n \lg \lg n)$ times we have very high success probability.

EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION of QFT

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The exponent in the l -th factor of the above decomposition can be written as follows

$$\begin{aligned} & \exp\left(\frac{\pi i(2^{m-1}x_{m-1} + 2^{m-2}x_{m-2} + \dots + 2x_1 + x_0)}{2^{l-1}}\right) \\ &= \exp\left(\frac{\pi i(2^{l-1}x_{l-1} + 2^{l-2}x_{l-2} + \dots + 2x_1 + x_0)}{2^{l-1}}\right) \\ &= (-1)^{x_{l-1}} \exp\left(\frac{\pi ix_{l-2}}{2}\right) \dots \exp\left(\frac{\pi ix_1}{2^{l-2}}\right) \exp\left(\frac{\pi ix_0}{2^{l-1}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

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If the unitary

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
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It has therefore $O(n^2)$ gates.

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Given is: An (efficiently computable) function $f : G \rightarrow R$, where G is a group and R is a finite set.

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A SEARCH PROBLEM and GROVER'S ALGORITHM

QUANTUM SEARCHING in UNORDERED SETS

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
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
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Grover's quantum algorithm exists that needs $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$ steps.


Here is the basic idea of the algorithm - "cooking" a solution.



COOKING SOLUTION BY GROVER ALGORITHM




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The figure above demonstrates some steps of the Grover algorithm.


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
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
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
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
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Inversion about the average is the unitary transformation

$$D_n : \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} a_i |\phi_i\rangle \rightarrow \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} (2E - a_i) |\phi_i\rangle,$$

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$$-H_n V_0^n H_n = D_n = \begin{pmatrix} -1 + \frac{2}{2^n} & \frac{2}{2^n} & \cdots & \frac{2}{2^n} \\ \frac{2}{2^n} & -1 + \frac{2}{2^n} & \ddots & \frac{2}{2^n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{2}{2^n} & \frac{2}{2^n} & \cdots & -1 + \frac{2}{2^n} \end{pmatrix}.$$

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The matrix D_n is clearly unitary and it can be shown to have the form $D_n = -H_n V_0^n H_n$, where

$$V_0^n[i, j] = 0 \text{ if } i \neq j, V_0^n[1, 1] = -1 \text{ and } V_0^n[i, i] = 1 \text{ if } 1 < i \leq n.$$

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Example: Let $a_i = a$ if $i \neq x_0$ and $a_{x_0} = -a$. Then

$$E = a - \frac{2}{2^n} a$$

$$2E - a_i = \begin{cases} a - \frac{4}{2^n} a & \text{if } i \neq x_0 \\ 2E - a_{x_0} = 3a - \frac{4}{2^n} a & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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Therefore, the value of $2E - a_i$ is smaller than a if $i \neq i_0$, and increases otherwise - if $i = i_0$.

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and iterate $\lfloor \frac{\pi}{4} \sqrt{2^n} \rfloor$ times the transformation (so called Grover's iterate):

$$- \underbrace{H_n V_0^n H_n V_f}_{} |\phi\rangle \rightarrow |\phi\rangle.$$

Afterwards, measure the register to get some x_1 (hopefully x_0) and check whether $f(x_1) = 1$. If not, repeat the procedure.

It has been shown that the above algorithm is optimal for finding the solution with probability $> \frac{1}{2}$.

In the case that there are t solutions, repeat the above iteration

$$\left\lfloor \frac{\pi}{4} \sqrt{\frac{2^n}{t}} \right\rfloor \text{ times.}$$

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and therefore

$$j_0 = \mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{\frac{2^n}{t}}\right).$$

A related problem to that of a search in an unordered list is a search in an ordered list of n items.

- The best upper bound known today is $\frac{3}{4} \lg n$.
- The best lower bound known today is $\frac{1}{12} \lg n - \mathcal{O}(1)$.

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It has been shown that also more generalized formulas of the type

$$\forall x_1 \exists y_1 \forall x_2 \exists y_2 \dots \forall x_k \exists y_k P(x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, \dots, x_k, y_k)$$

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- 3 Measure the first register. If y' is the outcome and $s_{y'} < s_y$, take as a new threshold the index y' .
- 3 Return as the output the last threshold y .

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Using QFT_{p-1} twice, on the third and fourth sub-register of the state $|x, g, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}\rangle$, we get

$$|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{p-1} \sum_{a=0}^{p-2} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} |x, g, a, b, \mathbf{0}\rangle,$$

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The resulting state will be:

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- Shor's result have been generalized to show that a large range of cryptosystems, including elliptic curve cryptosystems, would be vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers.

We show now basics how the concept of Fourier Transform is defined on any finite Abelian group.

CHARACTERS on ABELIAN GROUPS

Let G be an Abelian additive group and $|G| = n$. A **character** χ of G is any **morphism** $\chi : G \rightarrow \mathbf{C}/0$. That means that for any $g_1, g_2 \in G$ it holds:

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Let G be an Abelian additive group and $|G| = n$. A **character** χ of G is any **morphism** $\chi : G \rightarrow \mathbf{C}/0$. That means that for any $g_1, g_2 \in G$ it holds:

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Example 2 In the additive group \mathbf{F}_2^m , of all binary strings of length m , all characters have the form, for some binary m -bit strings x and y :

$$\chi_y(x) = (-1)^{x \cdot y},$$

where $x \cdot y = \sum_{i=1}^m x_i y_i \bmod 2$

ORTHOGONALITY of CHARACTERS

Any function $f : G \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$ on an Abelian group $G = \{g_1, \dots, g_n\}$ can be specified by the vector $(f(g_1), \dots, f(g_n))$, and if the scalar product of two functions is defined in the standard way as

$$\langle f|g \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n f^*(g_i)h(g_i),$$

then for any characters χ_1 and χ_2 on G it holds

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Therefore, the functions $\{B_i = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\chi_i\}$ form an orthonormal basis on the set of all functions $f : G \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$.

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Any function $f : G \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$ has a unique representation with respect to the basis

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Therefore in \mathbf{Z}_n the Fourier transform has the form

$$\hat{f}(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{y \in \mathbf{Z}_n} e^{-\frac{2\pi ixy}{n}} f(y)$$

and in \mathbf{F}_2^m the Fourier transform has the form

$$\hat{f}(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^m}} \sum_{y \in \mathbf{F}_2^m} (-1)^{x \cdot y} f(y).$$